Women, law and John Stuart Mill. by Ward,  Ian & McGlynn,  Clare
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
10 February 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Ward, Ian and McGlynn, Clare (2016) 'Women, law and John Stuart Mill.', Women's history review., 25 (2).
pp. 227-253.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09612025.2015.1039350
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor Francis Group in Women's history review on
26/05/2015, available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09612025.2015.1039350.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
forthcoming in (2015) Women’s History Review 
1 
 
Women, Law and John Stuart Mill 
 
Ian Ward and Clare McGlynn* 
Abstract 
John Stuart Mill’s intellectual reputation is unarguable; his liberal credentials seemingly 
impeccable. Moreover there seems to be a Mill for everyone; liberal, radical, feminist. The 
precise nature of the feminist Mill has however remained a matter of considerable debate. 
The purpose of this article is less to engage this speculation, but rather to invite closer 
consideration of what Mill actually said and wrote about women and the law in nineteenth 
century England. For Mill, the law was both an instrument of women’s subjection and a 
prospective means of liberation.   
Key Words 
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Article 
John Stuart Mill’s intellectual reputation is unarguable; his liberal credentials seemingly 
impeccable. Moreover there seems to be a Mill for everyone; a liberal Mill rather obviously, 
but also a conservative Mill, an ethical, even morally dogmatic Mill, an egalitarian and 
socialist Mill and a radical Mill, as well as a number of feminist Mills.1 It is the latter which 
is our chief concern. Critics have long supposed Mill to be some kind of feminist, his treatise 
The Subjection of Women constituting one of the ‘landmarks’ of modern feminism.2 He 
certainly wrote a great deal about the place of women in nineteenth century England. And 
campaigned on their behalf: ‘ardent and activist’, as Susan Moller Okin concludes; a tireless 
campaigner inside and outside Parliament, on paper and on the street.3 Few argue against the 
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through a Research Fellowship.  
1
  As Richard Reeves observes in his recent biography of Mill, his subject ‘has been claimed, and 
continues to be claimed, by pretty much everyone’. See his (2007) John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand, 
(London: Atlantic Books) p.8. Maria Morales identifies ‘the individualist, the classical liberal, the socialist, the 
classical utilitarian, the positivist, the elitist, the egalitarian, the pragmatic humanist, and the democrat bent on 
overthrowing privilege and oppression’, to which might be added a whole host of further Mills identified in the 
critical literature including the ethical, the radical libertarian and of course the feminist, liberal and radical: see 
Maria Morales, ‘Introduction’, in Maria Morales (ed.) (2005) Mill’s The Subjection of Women: critical essays, 
(Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield), p.xvi. An alternative list in presented by John Gibbins in his ‘JS Mill, 
liberalism and progress’, in Richard Bellamy (ed) Victorian Liberalism – nineteenth century political thought 
and practice (1990) at 91, referring to ‘the old and New Liberal, the conservative, the co-operative socialist, the 
democrat, the elitist, the libertine and the authoritarian’. The morally ‘dogmatic’ Mill was famously presented 
by Maurice Cowling in his (1990) Mill and Liberalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), at p.il. 
2
  See Alice Rossi, ‘Sentiment and Intellect: The Story of John Stuart Mill’s The Subjection of Women’, 
in Rossi (ed.) (1970) Essays on Sexual Equality, (Chicago: Chicago University Press), p.4. 
3
  Susan Moller Okin, ‘John Stuart Mill’s Feminism – The Subjection of Women and the Improvement of 
Mankind’, in Morales, Critical Essays, at p.25. 
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iconic status of Mill’s Subjection, even if some such as Gertrude Himmelfarb refer to it as a 
text more commonly ‘invoked than read’.4  
But precisely what kind of feminist Mill might have been remains a matter of contention. 
Critics have tended to prefer two alternatives, a liberal and a radical. The former kind of Mill 
is celebrated by the likes of Gertrude Himmelfarb, Zillah Eisenstein and Rosemarie Tong 
who situates her subject as the ‘paradigmatic liberal feminist’.5 This liberal Mill, as 
Himmelfarb suggests, might have ‘liked’ to have ‘put the procurer or keeper of a gambling 
house out of business, but he could not bring himself to do so without imperilling his basic 
principle’ of liberty.6 The liberal Mill is, of course, commonly associated with the passage in 
the Preface to his 1859 essay On Liberty in which could be found the ‘harm principle’: 
That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilized community, against their will, is to prevent harm to others.7 
As Richard Bellamy has suggested, the harm principle, and the essay in which it is found, is 
commonly read as a ‘paradigmatic statement of the liberal tradition’.8 This is true. But this 
does not mean to say that the reading is infallible. The principle was never intended to be 
absolute, or even particularly prescriptive. In the very following sentence Mill confirms that 
it is ‘hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the 
maturity of their faculties’. The ‘doctrine’ is contingent and qualified; applying in certain 
circumstances, but not in others. Mill’s most recent biographer has gone so far as to suggest 
that the ‘harm principle’ is ‘essentially a side-show’ found in a book which is anyway, for 
reason of its interpretative malleability, thoroughly ‘dangerous’.9 Such an extreme 
denunciation may be unusual. But it is certainly true that more recent scholarship has tended 
to move away from the classical libertarianism which characterised so much early twentieth 
century Mill criticism.10 
The radical Mill preferred by some feminist critics is more commonly aligned with an 
egalitarian Mill; the later Mill who wrote the second edition of The Principles of Political 
Economy, the essay on Social Freedom, published posthumously in 1907, and perhaps most 
importantly many of his various essays and speeches on the ‘question’ of women. It is this 
                                                          
4
  Gertrude Himmelfarb, (1974) On Liberty and Liberalism (New York: Alfred Knopf) at p.173-4. 
5
  See Rosemarie Tong (2008) Feminist Thought (Boulder: Westview Press) p.13, and Zilla Eisenstein 
(1986) The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism, (Boston: Northeastern University Press), p.127.  
6
  Himmelfarb, On Liberty, p.319. 
7
  CW vol.18, pp.223-4. Quotations from Mill are all referenced via his Collected Works (CW) as edited 
by John Robson and published by the University of Toronto, 1963-1991. The Collected Works are also available 
online at: http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Fperson=21&Itemid=28 
8
  See Richard Bellamy (1992) Liberalism and Modern Society – an historical argument (Cambridge: 
Polity Press), p.22 and also Reeves, Mill, at p.264, saying ‘love it or loathe it On Liberty is the New Testament 
of liberalism’. 
9
  Reeves, Mill, pp.263, 268. 
10
  See, for example, Raphael Cohen-Almagor (2012) ‘Between Autonomy and State Regulation: JS 
Mill’s Elastic Paternalism’, Philosophy, 87, pp.557-82, suggesting that Mill deploys alternative ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
varieties of paternalism in defence of wide range of state activity. 
forthcoming in (2015) Women’s History Review 
3 
 
Mill who is recommended by the likes of Keith Burgess-Jackson and Maria Morales who 
argues that a ‘substantive relational ideal’ underpins Mill’s pursuit of ‘perfect equality’.11 In 
similar terms, Gail Tulloch commends a Mill who appreciates the limits of formal equality 
and the consequential need for substantive ‘practical proposals’.12 There again, as Gertrude 
Himmelfarb has argued, the line between equality and liberty should not be drawn too 
brightly. There is much in the libertarian Mill which accommodates the egalitarian. Most 
notably, there is the strategic appreciation that the emancipation of women might serve to 
promote a broader instantiation of social equality and emancipation.13 It is the same 
accommodation which leads Martha Nussbaum to suggest that, as a consequence, Mill may 
have been the ‘first great radical feminist in the Western philosophical tradition’.14  
The purpose of this article is not to engage, at least directly, with this critical context. It is not 
concerned with sequestering Mill for any particular modern debate or campaign. It is rather to 
invite closer consideration of what Mill actually said and wrote about women and the law in 
nineteenth century England, focusing not just on those areas in which Mill’s critical 
reputation is already established, such as marriage and suffrage reform, but also on those 
which have escaped the same degree of critical attention, such as domestic abuse and 
prostitution. This is not a simple task, not least because he wrote so much, both in public and 
in private. And there is context too. Mill wrote at a particular moment in English legal 
history, one that historians like to term an ‘age of reform’. The moment stimulated him. It 
also sharpened his strategic awareness. Mill was a shrewd writer, ever-sensitive to his 
audience, parliamentarian or public.15 And his opinions changed, in part a result of altered 
personal circumstance and in part a consequence of shifting public interest and opinion. 
Different pieces of legislation came and went, as did different women’s organisations. 
Victorian feminism was nascent and febrile. Its energies waxed and waned, its attention 
drifted. And different feminists thought different things too, often as a consequence of the 
same shifting contexts.16 A ‘public man’ first, a philosophical speculator second, Mill was 
susceptible to all of this.17 As we will see, most of what he wrote was responsive, especially 
in relation to women. Thus, in regard to the ‘question of women’ and, particularly, the place 
of law in its determination, Mill was animated by those issues which likewise animated his 
contemporaries; marriage and divorce, domestic abuse, prostitution, the vote. He did not, 
                                                          
11
  Maria Morales, ‘The Corrupting Influence of Power’ in Morales, Subjection, p.100, and also Keith 
Burgess-Jackson, ‘John Stuart Mill, Radical Feminist’, in Morales, Subjection, pp.84-7. 
12
  Gail Tulloch (1989) Mill and Sexual Equality (Harvester Wheatsheaf: Hemel Hempstead, 1989), p.xvi. 
For similar sentiments, see Hollie Mann and Jeff Spinner-Halev (2010) ‘John Stuart Mill’s Feminism: On 
Progress, the State, and the Path to Justice’ Polity 42, p.256. 
13
  Himmelfarb, On Liberty, p.181. 
14
  Nussbaum is quoted in Reeves, Mill, p.414. 
15
  For which reason, Reeves suggests, he kept many of his views on women ‘mostly under wraps’. See 
ibid, 435, and also Keith Burgess Jackson making much the same point in his ‘Radical Feminist’, at p.73, 
Elizabeth Smith (2001) ‘John Stuart Mill’s The Subjection of Women: A Re-examination’Polity, 34, pp.195-6, 
201, and also Tulloch, Mill, p.116, emphasising the same, that Mill ‘was no salon liberal but a realistic and 
pragmatic activist’. 
16
  See here Barbara Cain (1992) Victorian Feminists, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, particularly 
pp.33-42. 
17
  See here Mariana Szapuova (2006) ‘Mill’s Liberal Feminism: Its Legacy and Current Criticism’ 
Prolegomena, 55, p.180. 
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conversely, engage in matters which, though significant in modern feminist debate, failed to 
register so much in mid-Victorian England. In such cases, we are left to speculate.18 Context 
is here determinative; for which reason before we revisit what Mill actually wrote, we must 
first contemplate the milieu in which he wrote.  
Mill in his Milieu 
Whether or not Mill seems quite so radical today, he was certainly perceived to be so by his 
contemporaries: arrested for distributing birth control pamphlets at seventeen, before 
graduating into a lifetime of cajoling suffrage committees, chastising fellow parliamentarians 
and horrifying Royal Commissioners.19 And of course writer of essays and treatises which, in 
the perception of many, threatened to bring western civilization to its knees.20 According to 
one critic, Subjection in particular was a work of ‘rank moral and social anarchy’, of which 
the ‘practical application would be as injurious as its theory is false’.21 Blackwood’s 
concluded that the author of Subjection ‘corresponds to the lunatic who proved logically that 
all the rest of the world was insane’.22 In his Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, James Fitzjames 
Stephen famously declared that the same thoroughly ‘unpleasant’ essay was ‘a work from 
which I dissent from the first sentence to the last’.23 Of course Mill wrote about many 
subjects. But few occupied more of his time at the writing-desk than the ‘question’ of 
women. Regular correspondents here included the Fawcetts, Henry Crabbe Robinson and 
Florence Nightingale, as well as radical Parliamentarian allies such as Charles Bradlaugh and 
Sir Charles Dilke. More irregular were the dozens of chairs of local suffrage societies who 
wrote extending invitations to give lectures or asking for advice on how best to compose 
parliamentary petitions. Here again context provided the immediate stimulus. Whilst earlier 
correspondence tended to be more personal and reflective, the later is focused on statutory 
reforms such as the 1858 Divorce Act and the 1867 Reform Act, for which reason it reads as 
being rather more strategic, though sometimes rather more irascible too. By the end of the 
1860s, Mill was no longer simply articulating his own preferences and prejudices; he was 
shaping a revolutionary movement.  
Except that he was, of course, still articulating his own prejudices. An evident dislike of 
‘pushing’ women, a subject to which he constantly eludes in correspondence during the late 
1860s and early 1870s, is here instructive for two reasons. A first is again to do with strategy. 
                                                          
18
  Most commonly in relation to pornography. While Mill did not express a view on this subject, he is 
commonly invoked in contemporary debates. For our own speculations in this regard, see Clare McGlynn and 
Ian Ward (2014) ‘Would John Stuart Mill have Regulated Pornography?’ Journal of Law and Society, 41, 
pp.500-22. 
19
  Richard Reeves opens his recent biography of Mill with an account of his distributing birth control 
pamphlets and his subsequent prosecution before the local magistrates. Mill was just seventeen and was, it 
seems, motivated by the experience of finding the corpse of an abandoned, and apparently murdered, baby in St 
James Park. See Reeves, Mill, pp.1-2. 
20
  See David Brink (2013) Mill’s Progressive Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.261, 
concluding that read in context, Mill’s Subjection remains ‘radical, courageous, even eloquent’. 
21
  Quoted in Susan Mendus, ‘The Marriage of True Minds – the Ideal of Marriage in the Philosophy of 
John Stuart Mill’, in Morales, Subjection, at p.134. 
22
  Quoted in Smith, ‘Re-examination’, p.202. 
23
  In Moller Okin, ‘Feminism’, at p.43 and Mary Shanley, ‘Marital Slavery and Friendship: John Stuart 
Mill’s The Subjection of Women’, in Morales, Subjection, at 119. 
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Mill feared that certain ‘pushing’ women and likeminded ‘vulgar self-seekers’ would derail 
the suffrage campaign by applying some of the more ‘common vulgar motives and tactics’ 
which had become familiar in the campaign to repeal the Contagious Diseases Acts which 
sought to regulate prostitution.24 Mill was a supporter of the latter campaign, as we shall see. 
But he was also convinced that suffrage, much the larger issue in his mind, required more 
strategic management. Too radical actions would be ‘simply suicidal’.25 Repeal of the 
Contagious Diseases Acts might be achieved by the simpler matter of irritating certain law 
officers and Parliamentarians. Securing the suffrage required the gentler persuasion of a 
nation. The second reason relates to something rather less calculating; for the very same 
correspondence also betrays something more visceral; personal animosity, and perhaps an 
element of paranoia too. His increasingly agitated correspondence regarding Caroline Ashurst 
Biggs, who served as Secretary of the London National Suffrage Society in 1869 and 1870, 
and her ‘obnoxious set’ of supporters, borders on the obsessive.26  
It was not the only visceral prejudice which coloured Mill’s engagement with the ‘question’ 
of women. There is nothing especially unusual in the fact that Mill’s perception of sexual 
activity was conflicted and troubled. Many of his contemporaries were just as troubled. But in 
Mill’s case there is again a sense of obsessive anxiety.27 At root, he was concerned by the fact 
that sex seemed to make many people happy, but in all the wrong ways. The achievement of 
happiness was, of course, the very essence of utilitarian philosophy. But it was a certain kind 
of happiness, the improving kind, the kind realised by the ‘pleasures of the intellect’ that 
must be sought.28 It was certainly not the kind of happiness achieved in the transient 
satisfaction of sexual lust. As he confirmed in his 1863 essay Utilitarianism, a ‘beast’s 
pleasures do not satisfy a human being’s conception of happiness’.29  
                                                          
24
  CW vol.17, pp.1742-3, 1843. The same argument is urged in later correspondence with Croom 
Robertson at 1846.  
25
  CW vol.17, p.1854. 
26
  See for example CW vol.17, pp.1823-5, and also pp.1834-6, seeking to engineer a ‘breach’ which 
would bring the matter of strategic direction, and Caroline’s Secretaryship, to a head, and then again 1842-3, 
expressing ‘much astonishment’ that the Committee had resisted the idea of pursuing a vote of censure. The 
tirade against the ‘obnoxious set’ can be found in later correspondence at 1849, as can a suggestively long letter 
to Croom Robertson in which Mill conjectures the likely support of each and every Committee member, 
categorised, at 1850-1, into the ‘Certain’, the ‘Uncertain’, and the ‘Perhaps hostile’. Ironically Caroline had 
originally been persuaded to become more actively involved in the Society by Mill’s daughter Helen, who had 
played a significant part in establishing the London ‘National’ Society. The fact that Caroline’s brother-in-law 
was also serving as Treasurer of the Society during this period was clearly an added source of agitation to Mill. 
Caroline was one of five siblings of the radical lawyer William Ashurst. All were activist. Caroline was also a 
leading light in the Ladies London Emancipation Society and St Mary’s Dispensary for Women and Children. 
She married James Stansfield, another wealthy radical lawyer, friend of Cobden and Giuseppe Mazzini, both of 
whom were regular house guests. As the correspondence reveals, for a while Henry Crabbe Robinson tried to 
broker some kind of accommodation between Mill and Biggs. In the end he gave up. Mill had his way and 
Biggs resigned her Secretaryship, taking a number of supporters with her. Mill’s daughter Helen took her place. 
A few years later however Caroline was back in office where she remained until 1883. For a commentary on the 
tension that developed between the Mills and the London National Society, and its consequences, see Barbara 
Caine (1978) ‘John Stuart Milll and the English Women’s Movement’, Historical Studies, 18, pp.52-67. 
27
  Susan Mendus refers to Mill’s ‘deep-rooted prejudices on the subject of sexuality’, in ‘True Minds’, at 
p.137. 
28
  And the ‘elitist’ kind, as Susan Moller Okin observes. See her ‘Feminism’, p.32, and also Cohen-
Almagor, ‘Autonomy’, pp.575-6.  
29
  Utilitarianism, CW vol X, at pp. 210-211. 
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One of the defining characteristics of the ‘higher’ minded was an ability to rise above the 
‘animal passions’. The achievement of this particular elevation was the mark of 
‘civilization’.30 A journal entry for April 1854 reads: ‘I am anxious to leave on record at least 
in this place my deliberate opinion that any great improvement in human life is not to be 
looked for so long as the animal instinct of sex occupies the absurdly disproportionate place it 
does therein’.31 The ability to rise above the baser passions was all part of what defined the 
‘character’ of the upstanding middle-class Victorian.32  And the day would come, as indeed it 
was fast approaching, when this ‘particular passion’ would come ‘completely under the 
control of reason’.33 This might all seem rather fanciful today; but the prejudices matter, not 
least because what he felt inevitably shaded what he wrote.  
Again there is nothing surprising in the fact that Mill shared a number of contemporary 
prejudices in regard to sexual activity. It would only have been odd if he had not. And the 
same can be said of various other prejudices, each of which he sought to intellectualise, but 
each of which was at root as much a matter of simple moral preference. He took, for example, 
just as dim a view of gambling and drunkenness as he did lust and prostitution. In On Liberty 
he quoted approvingly from the manifesto of the Alliance for the Legislative Suppression of 
the Traffic in All Intoxicating Liquors in Britain. ‘I claim, as a citizen, a right to legislate 
whenever my social rights are invaded by another’, he wrote, continuing: ‘If anything invades 
my social rights, certainly the traffic in strong drink does. It destroys my primary right to 
security, by constantly creating and sustaining social disorder’.34 As he had already argued in 
his earlier essay on Coleridge the state has a responsibility to ‘beneficially employ its powers’ 
where it could better promote ‘the public welfare’.35 Here again it is important to remember 
that Mill was a pragmatist, a campaigner first and a philosopher second. He pondered the 
possibilities of ‘perfectibility’. He thought about what might improve his fellow mid-
Victorians and what might not. He concluded, as we shall see, that reform of the matrimonial 
law would improve marriage, that repeal of the Contagious Diseases Acts would restrain the 
‘license’ of ‘animal passions’, and that granting the vote to women would make England a 
better place in which to live, not just for women but for men, and probably a better governed 
place too. Each resolution could be defended in terms of principle, of liberty and equality. 
But more importantly each could be defended in terms of utility: each would work. 
A happy consequence of his active engagement with these various causes was Mill’s 
association with his future wife Harriet Taylor.36 They had first met in 1830 when Harriet and 
                                                          
30
  CW vol.2, p.367. In an unpublished essay entitled ‘On Marriage’, Mill emphasised once again that ‘all 
the difficulties of morality… grow out of the conflict which continually arises between the highest morality and 
even the best popular morality’. See CW vol.21, p.39. 
31
  CW vol.27, p.664. 
32
  See Bellamy, Liberalism, pp.132-4. 
33
  Mill made the assertion in correspondence with Lord Amberley on the subject of the Contagious 
Diseases Act and the campaign for their repeal in 1870. CW vol.17, p.1693. 
34
  CW vol.18, p.298. 
35
  See his comments in his essay on Coleridge, in CW vol.10, p.156. 
36
  Later in his Autobiography, Mill paid loving, and extensive, tribute to the woman whose ‘friendship 
has been the honour and chief blessing of my existence’. CW vol.1, p.93. 
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her then husband John invited Mill to one of their dinner parties.37 By 1833 there were 
rumours. There was also a lot of correspondence, some personal, much addressing the so-
called ‘question of women’ and more particularly the institution of marriage. By the latter 
part of the 1840s they were composing essays and papers together, and had settled into what 
Mill termed a state of ‘imperfect companionship’.38 The spring of 1839 was spent holidaying 
in Italy together, along with Harriet’s daughter Lily. John Taylor stayed in England, 
ostensibly to look after some decorating. It was hardly likely that the rumours would be 
abated, and they were not. Indeed, it was insinuated, not least by Radicals horrified by 
disparaging comments they encountered in Mill’s 1838 essay on Bentham, that Harriet’s 
influence had begun to corrupt John Stuart’s writings as well as his morals.39 There is 
certainly no doubting that Harriet exerted a considerable intellectual influence on Mill; 
though precisely how considerable remains moot.40 In his Autobiography, Mill later admitted 
that On Liberty ‘was more directly and literally our joint production than anything else which 
bears my mind, for there was not a sentence of it that was not several times gone through by 
us together, turned over in many ways, and carefully weeded out of any faults, either in 
thought or expression, that we detected in it’.41 There is a necessary poignancy here. Harriet 
died in November 1858, as Mill was putting the final touches to On Liberty. It was dedicated 
to her memory.42 
After On Liberty he turned to completing Subjection which was finished by the middle of 
1861. In many ways, On Liberty and Subjection might seem to be very different texts. Yet 
they can be read as complementary, not least because Harriet’s imprint is so evident in both.43 
In laudatory comments prefaced to the republication of his 1851 essay on the 
Enfranchisement of Women, Mill paid tribute to his recently deceased wife, Harriet Taylor 
Mill, as the real author.44 The following ‘essay is hers in a peculiar sense, my share in it being 
little more than that of an editor or amanuensis’; a testament that assumes greater import 
when the immediate comparisons between the arguments found in it and in the Subjection are 
                                                          
37
  John was a wealthy pharmacist and supporter of radical causes, ‘an innocent dull good man’ according 
to Carlyle, who also reported that their marriage was happy. See Reeves, Mill, p.81. 
38
  As opposed to a perfect state of companionship which was, of course, marriage. The essays, including 
reciprocal commentaries on marriage, are reprinted in CW vol.21 at pp.375-92. Later commentators have liked 
to surmise whether John Stuart and Harriet actually engaged in sexual intercourse before their marriage. It can 
only be surmise. See Reeves, Mill, pp.138-9, 150-3, and Rossi, ‘Sentiment’, pp.28-9. 
39
  See here Rossi, ibid, pp.35-9. 
40
  In a letter of April 1854 Mill can be found asking ‘my angel to tell me what should be the next essay 
written’. How genuinely the plea was felt must remain a matter of conjecture. See CW vol.14, p.197. 
41
   CW vol.1, pp.257-8.The sentiment is reinforced by correspondence from January 1855 in which Mill 
confirms to Harriet that he is ‘able & disposed to write a very good volume on Liberty, if we decide that that is 
to be the subject’. CW vol.14, p.300. 
42
  In his Autobiography, Mill confirmed that in the months following Harriet’s death he was driven by a 
determination to publish the essay and ‘consecrate it to her memory’. CW vol.1, p.261 
43
   See here Smith, ‘Re-examination’, pp.191-2, and also Himmelfarb, On Liberty, pp.207, observing that 
it is ‘not surprising’ that ‘the question of women should have intruded upon his thought more persistently and 
profoundly during the period of their marriage – which was also the period when Mill was writing and rewriting 
On Liberty’. 
44
  See here Moller Okin, ‘Feminism’, pp.29-30, and also Rossi, ‘Sentiment’, p.41, concluding that Harriet 
was indeed the ‘primary’, perhaps even the sole, author of the Enfranchisement. 
forthcoming in (2015) Women’s History Review 
8 
 
realised.45 Her influence was also more general, with Mill describing the ‘wise scepticism’ 
which Harriet brought to his writing.46  
Without diminishing his radicalism or his libertarianism, Harriet was a particular influence in 
at least three important ways. First, she nurtured a particular focus on the ‘subjection’ of 
women. Secondly, she tightened the focus still further, so that the real issue was the state of 
marriage law and the urgent need for its reform. At one point in an essay, Harriet pauses, in 
parentheses, to declare: ‘I feel like a lawyer in talking of it only!’47 And, thirdly, she 
concentrated Mill’s mind on the relation of equality with liberty, and again more specifically 
still on the issue of female suffrage; an inference further confirmed by the sentiments written 
into the prefatory comments to the republished version of his 1851 essay on the 
Enfranchisement of Women. In sum, it might be argued, she radicalised Mill.48 
As a consequence, it might be further conjectured that Harriet also firmed up Mill’s sense of 
mission, his determination to apply conceptual insight to practical problems.49 And none was 
perhaps larger, in either John Stuart’s mind, or Harriet’s, than the relation between state and 
citizen. As we shall see in the following sections, the question of state regulation loomed 
large in much of what Mill wrote. It animated, very obviously, the ‘harm principle’. It did not 
however, as we have already intimated, preclude the possibility, where appropriate, of state 
intervention. As David Dyzenhaus has argued, the ‘harm principle’ can be just as readily 
deployed to justify legislation, in order to protect the ‘interests’ of individuals.50 Thus, whilst 
the principle is commonly cherished by libertarian advocates of free expression, for example, 
it might be surmised that Mill would have placed a number of conditions around the practical 
exercise of this particular liberty; most obviously those of responsibility.51 So much is a 
matter for speculation. But it might also be noted that Mill elsewhere affirmed that ‘liberty is 
often granted where it should be withheld, as well as withheld where it should be granted’52; 
emphasising to an audience of campaigners for women’s suffrage in 1870 that the ‘favourite 
sins’ of government ‘are indolence and indifference’.53 Mill never doubted the place of law 
and government in the shaping of society. The question was simply one of efficacy and 
extent. 
On Marriage and ‘Domestic Tyranny’  
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While The Subjection of Women was primarily written as a commentary on marriage and 
matrimonial property law, readers of On Liberty would have anticipated the line that Mill 
would take. The ‘almost despotic power of husbands over wives’, he had written in 1859, 
‘need not be enlarged upon here, because nothing is more needed for the complete removal of 
the evil, than that wives should have the same rights, and should receive the protection of law 
in the same manner as all other persons’.54 It was a view which had been evidently shaped 
during Mill’s correspondence with Harriet during the 1830s and 1840s. It was not, as this 
correspondence reveals, merely a matter of reforming marriage for its own sake: 
The question is not what marriage ought to be, but a far wider question, what women 
ought to be. Settle that first, and the other will settle itself. Determine whether 
marriage is to be a relation between two equal beings, or between a superior and an 
inferior, between a protector and a dependent, and all other doubts will be easily 
solved.55 
It was such views which he developed in Subjection, particularly his conception of equality. 
At the very outset of Subjection Mill outlined: 
That the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the sexes – the 
legal subordination of one sex to the other – is wrong in itself, and now one of the 
chief hindrances to human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a 
principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor 
disability on the other.56 
It was not, however, the idea of marriage which troubled Mill. He married himself. John 
Taylor having died in 1849, John Stuart and Harriet married in April 1851. As he made plain 
in his unpublished Statement on Marriage, dated a few weeks before his marriage, it was the 
consequences of the ‘marriage relation as constituted by law’ that bothered Mill. Later in 
Subjection, Mill presented an alternative ‘ideal’ marriage, a marriage of ‘true minds’ based 
on the improvement of ‘moral sentiments’.57  The idea of ‘companionate’ marriage, which 
had been ventured in the literature since the mid-eighteenth century, had a kind of utilitarian 
resonance.58 A companionate marriage was supposed to be a happier marriage, and in order 
to achieve this, matrimonial law would have to be reformed; to recalibrate ‘existing social 
relations between the sexes’, to replace the ‘legal subordination of one sex to other’ with an 
alternative ‘principle of perfect equality’.59 While this sounds ideal, Mill’s ‘ideal’ marriage 
has troubled some later feminist critics. Susan Mendus finds it ‘deeply depressing and 
distorted’.60 The idea of a companionate marriage of ‘true minds’ is fine. But there are a lot 
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of collateral assumptions that seem rather too familiar, not least of which is the assumption 
that once married, women should stay at home and do the baking; a division of labour which 
Mill justifies as being the most ‘suitable’.61 
Notwithstanding his acceptance of ‘separate spheres’ in the marital home, Mill famously 
drew a parallel between the legal condition of married women and that of slaves: ‘Marriage is 
the only actual bondage known to our law. There remain no legal slaves, except the mistress 
of every house’.62  The allusion was intended to shock, and it did.63 English matrimonial law, 
Mill declared, is a ‘law of servitude’, a ‘monstrous contradiction to all the principles of the 
modern world’. The wife ‘is the actual bondservant of her husband no less so, as far as legal 
obligation goes, than slaves commonly so called’.64 Except, Mill pointedly infers, there are 
no longer any slaves in England. And so ‘the disabilities’, therefore, ‘to which woman are 
subject from the mere fact of their birth, are the solitary examples of the kind in modern 
legislation’.65 And indeed, their condition is actually worse than that of slaves, for there is no 
possibility of ‘peculium’, and moreover no legal power to resist their sexual violation. For 
‘however brutal a tyrant she may unfortunately be chained to’ and ‘though she may feel it 
impossible not to loathe him – he can claim from her and enforce the lowest degradation  of a 
human being, that of being made the instrument of an animal function contrary to her 
inclination’.66 Plainly put, the law condoned marital rape.67   
It is the law then which renders the married woman a slave. But reform of the law is not the 
only mechanism for making marriages happy. Reform of cultural expectations is another. The 
‘moral sentiments’ would not improve themselves. The legal subordination of women is a 
customary prejudice, an ‘eminently artificial thing’, the ‘relic of an old world of thought’ 
which presumed women to possess inferior mental and physical capabilities.68 And whilst in 
the age of ‘progression’ the ‘condition of women has been approaching nearer to equality 
with men’, the same prejudices retained a place in the ‘silly’ poetics of ‘loving submission’ 
which celebrated the ‘angel in the house’.69 It was, as we shall see, the same poetic that 
militated against the idea that women should seek to engage in public life, or even be 
permitted to vote for others who might.  
Better education might also make for ‘better’ marriages. Intended spouses would be more 
circumspect. As Harriet, who had first married aged just eighteen, commented, ‘In the present 
system of habits and opinions, girls enter into what is called a contract perfectly ignorant of 
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the conditions of it, and that they should be so is considered absolutely essential to their 
fitness for it’.70 Mill agreed entirely. ‘Of all the more serious acts of the life of a human 
being’ there ‘is not one which is commonly performed with so little of forethought and 
consideration, and which is irrevocable’.71 Lack of thought and education was one problem. 
Lack of money was another.  It was not just a matter of making sure that intending couples 
had enough money to marry. So too should they be obliged to evidence sufficient funds to 
bring up children. Producing children without having the necessary resources to feed them, 
Mill opined in On Liberty, was a ‘moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and 
against society’.72 There is nothing odd in advancing the opinion that engaged parties might 
be better informed of their legal responsibilities. Rather odder perhaps is the argument that 
they should be first assessed as to their financial capabilities; except that in making this 
recommendation Mill was merely approving similar practices observed elsewhere in Europe, 
at which point the idea only seems odd insofar as it offends modern sensibilities. From the 
perspective of a nineteenth century utilitarian, it could be regarded as an entirely sensible 
caution. The same might be said of the suggestion that families might be limited in the 
number of children they were permitted. Mill had read Malthus and was worried. Such a 
measure was ‘absolutely necessary to place human life on its proper footing, even if there 
were subsistence for any number that could be produced’.73 
Whilst none of these proposals ever came close to the statute book, Mill did witness the 
passage of two significant pieces of matrimonial legislation. The first was the 1858 Divorce 
Act. The second, at the very end of his life, was the 1870 Matrimonial Property Act. Neither 
was intended to enhance the prospect of an ‘ideal’ marriage. On the contrary, the primary 
purpose of the former, and a secondary purpose of the latter, was to deal with the 
consequences of an unhappy one. Mill supported both on these terms. He supported the 1858 
Act because, despite its evident deficiencies in regard to child custody provisions, making 
adequate financial provision, and the notorious inconsistency in regard to securing grounds 
for divorce, it still provided a means by which an abused wife might, in theory at least, escape 
a violent marriage.  
In an unpublished essay drafted before 1858, Mill had identified the apparent ‘indissolubility 
of marriage’ as the ‘keystone’ of female subjugation.74 In his perception, the ‘question’ of 
marriage was inextricably tied to that of domestic violence. Even the happiest of marriages 
insinuated a culture of ‘submission and yielding’.75 Some of course preferred to keep such 
abuse behind closed doors and out of sight. ‘There are private histories belonging to every 
family’, the doyenne of Victorian domestic handbooks Sarah Stickney Ellis gravely advised, 
‘which, though they operate powerfully upon individual happiness, ought never to be named 
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beyond the home-circle’.76 Others were less inhibited. Abused wives could be found across 
the Victorian literary canon, making clear to the reading public that abuse was commonplace; 
George Eliot’s Janet Dempster, Thackeray’s Clara Newcome; all the abused Bronte heroines, 
Helen Huntingdon, Millicent Hattersley, Isabel Linton, Bertha Mason, and all the Dickensian 
found in the pages of Dombey and Son, The Old Curiosity Shop and Bleak House, as well of 
course as perhaps the most famously beaten ‘wife’ of all, Oliver Twist’s Nancy Sikes.  
Mill found the incidence of spousal violence horrifying and shameful, and was just as 
determined that his readers should too. As early as 1851 he was treating readers of the 
Morning Chronicle to accounts of recent wife-murder cases, with the scarcely veiled 
insinuation that the ‘disgrace’ did not rest solely with the perpetrators of such heinous deeds. 
It was the clear duty of Parliament to redress a patent failing in the ‘criminal code’ which 
permitted ‘domestic tyrants’ to ‘perpetuate’ their ‘tyrannies’ with the seeming approval of 
judges and juries across the length and breadth of the country.77 Much of the second chapter 
of Subjection was given over to recounting incidences of the same ‘domestic tyranny’, and its 
larger consequences.78 His fellow Parliamentarians were likewise left in no doubt. In his 1867 
speech On the Admission of Women to the Electoral Franchise, Mill declared: 
I should like to have a return laid annually before the House of the number of women 
who are annually beaten to death, kicked to death or trampled to death by their male 
protectors: and in the opposite column, the amount of sentences passed, in those cases 
in which the dastardly criminals did not get off altogether. I should also like to have, 
in a third column, the amount of property, the unlawful taking of which was, at the 
same sessions or assizes, by the same judge thought worthy of the same amount of 
punishment. We should then have an arithmetical estimate of the value set by a male 
legislature and male tribunals on the murder of a woman, often by torture continued 
through the years, which, if there is any shame in us, would make us hang our heads.79 
Moreover the abuse is not just physical, as Mill observed. It was the anticipation. So many 
married women lived in a ‘chronic state of bribery and intimidation combined’.80 And it was 
of course this same intimidation which militated against women reporting their abuse. ‘There 
is never any want of women who complain of ill usage by their husbands’, Mill suggested, 
and there ‘would be infinitely more, if complaint were not the greatest of all provocations to a 
repetition and increase of ill usage’. He continued: 
Accordingly wives, even in the most extreme and protracted cases of bodily ill usage, 
hardly ever dare avail themselves of the laws made for their protection: and if, in a 
moment of irrepressible indignation, or by the interference of neighbours, they are 
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induced to do so, their whole effort afterwards is to disclose as little as they can, and 
to beg off their tyrant from his merited chastisement.81 
Abused wives had no credible recourse in criminal law or in matrimonial law as it stood 
before the 1858 Divorce Act. It was for this reason that Mill supported various bills intended 
to toughen criminal penalties against convicted abusers; to an extent which might again seem 
discomforting to the modern liberal reader. In an essay written in support of a proposed ‘Bill 
for the Better Prevention and Punishment of Assaults on Women and Children’, enacted in 
1853, Mill expressed his entire support for increased fines. In addition, however, he 
suggested that the introduction of ‘corporal’ punishment, ‘prompt and certain’, was 
‘peculiarly fitted’ and far more likely to be efficacious. Not only might it deter the beater 
from beating again, but as a salutary ‘instrument’ of ‘moral education’, it might equally deter 
others similarly tempted.82  
It was for these reasons that Mill supported the Divorce Act, despite its inherent inequalities 
in regard to securing grounds for separation and adequate maintenance. And it was because 
the deficiencies of the 1858 Act became all too obvious in the years which followed that Mill 
continued to campaign for further reform of England’s marriage laws. And, indeed, its 
constitutional laws, for it would only be when women secured the vote, he later opined in his 
1871 address to an Edinburgh audience of suffrage campaigners, that Parliament would be 
persuaded to take serious steps to eradicate the ‘domestic tyranny’ of spousal abuse.83 
The purpose of the 1870 Matrimonial Property Act was to address certain deficiencies in the 
1858 Act; deficiencies about which Mill had repeatedly written during the intervening 
decade. Indeed, he had raised the issue of matrimonial property law as early as 1850 in an 
article on the new Californian constitution which was published in the Daily News. Amongst 
the many things which the Californians now did better than the English was to recognise the 
inalienable right of married women to ‘their own property’.84 In Subjection, Mill had already 
ventured the radical idea that during marriage both spouses might retain a ‘separate interest in 
money matters’. The legally instantiated impoverishment of wives was a ‘particular injustice’ 
calculated not just to subjugate, but to diminish the ‘dignity of a woman’.85 He had also 
raised the issue in Parliament in May 1867 during an harangue on the subject of the 
Admission of Women to the Electoral Franchise, and again a year later in June 1868, treating 
his fellow Members to a litany of reported cases in which former husbands had deployed all 
manner of means, some legal, others not, in order to evade their financial responsibilities and 
retain control of their spouses’ property. ‘Like felons’, Mill wondered, why was it still the 
case that married women were ‘incapable’ in law ‘of holding property’.86 The injustice 
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seemed so obvious to him; as did the injustices evident in relation to both the existence of 
prostitution and its regulation.  
On Prostitution 
Mill’s engagement with the issue of prostitution was again animated by contemporary events. 
Concern about the fate of the ‘fallen’ woman had become a touchstone of respectable mid-
Victorian sentiment, finding expression in anxious essays, sensational novels and maudlin 
verse. Writing in 1850, the renowned critic WR Greg pronounced it to be ‘the darkest, the 
knottiest and the saddest’ problem which he and his contemporaries faced.87 Troubled 
gentlemen devised various strategies. Charles Dickens established a refuge. William Ewart 
Gladstone dedicated his evenings to wandering the streets looking for souls to save. Lord 
Palmerston however decided to enact some legislation. And so in 1864, concerned at the 
apparent increase in venereal disease amongst Navy personnel, Palmerston’s government 
passed the first of a series of Contagious Diseases Acts. The Acts empowered the relevant 
authorities to subject suspected prostitutes in certain ports and barrack-towns to invasive 
internal examination and, if found to be suffering from venereal disease, to confine them, 
without their consent, to specific ‘lock’ hospitals for up to nine months. Interestingly, the 
1864 Act generated relatively little comment. Subsequent legislation, which broadened the 
geographical reach of the provisions, did however. More particularly, the issue became a 
focal point for a still largely nascent mid-Victorian women’s movement. In 1869 Josephine 
Butler formed the Ladies National Association for the Repeal of the Contagious Diseases Act 
(LNA).88 It quickly attracted considerable support. 
For Mill, there was no legislation so ‘utterly depriving to the mass of the population’, none 
which better illustrated the ‘gross inequality between men and women’.89 Mill’s personal 
correspondence during the later 1860s and early 1870s confirms the extent of his dedication 
to the cause. Writing in support of the repeal campaigner William Malleson in January 1870, 
he stated:  
Of course one need scarcely say that to any man who looks upon political institutions 
& legislation from the point of view of principle the idea of keeping a large army in 
idleness & vice & then keeping a large army of prostitutes to pander to their vices is 
too monstrous to admit of a moment’s consideration, while the safety of the country 
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could be provided for by the military education of all classes, or until after every 
possible experiment with married soldiers had been tried & failed.90 
There can be no denying the prurience written into this passage. Mill, as we have already 
noted, struggled to reconcile himself to the ‘passions’ of sexuality. In private correspondence 
with Lord Amberley, regarding the prospective repeal of the Contagious Diseases Acts in 
February 1870, Mill commented on William Lecky’s recently published History of European 
Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne. ‘I am’, he opined, ‘entirely at issue as to prostitution 
being the least bad form of illicit sexuality’, as Lecky had inferred. On the contrary: ‘I think it 
by far the most degrading and most mischievous’.91  
Given his broader reputation as one of the foremost public intellectuals of his day, and his 
association, however cautious, with the repeal campaign, there was no surprise in Mill being 
invited to give evidence before the Royal Commission established to investigate the working 
of the Contagious Diseases Acts. In all there were more than eighty witnesses called before 
the Commission, including assorted military and police officers, concerned clergymen and 
reform campaigners, and various other apparently interested parties. The Report which 
appeared the following year tried to create a coherent narrative from the myriad opinions it 
had received. It was not easy. The coordinates however were familiar and predictable; the 
problem lay with ‘common’ prostitutes and the diseases which they carried, and the state had 
a responsibility to do something about it and them.92 Mill however took a different line, 
choosing instead to challenge many of the assumptions which underpinned contemporary 
attitudes to prostitution. The Acts, Mill stated, were ‘opposed to one of the greatest principles 
of legislation, the security of personal liberty’.93 He had no objection to the state assuming 
responsibility to protect public health, if indeed this was what the Acts were about. He did, 
however, have a serious problem with the state ‘consigning’ women ‘to hospitals against their 
will’.94 This was, as he later confided to a correspondent, another species of ‘tyranny’.95 
Mill’s position met with a mixture of disdain and incredulity. Whilst he certainly shared the 
contemporary view that prostitution was a social ‘evil’, the suggestion that the principle 
responsibility for this evil rested with men was quite contrary to the view preferred by the 
Royal Commission.96 In regard to the ‘sin of fornication’, the Commissioners concluded in 
their Report, ‘there is no comparison to be made between prostitutes and the men who 
consort with them. With the one sex the offence is committed as a matter of gain, with the 
other it is an irregular indulgence of a natural impulse’.97 In his evidence to the Commission, 
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Mill countered with the observation that a ‘woman cannot communicate the disease but to a 
person who seeks it, and who knowingly places himself in the way of it’, adding the caution 
that a ‘woman can only communicate it through a man; it must be the man who 
communicates it to innocent women and children afterwards’.98 The natural conclusion to this 
line of thought was hardly calculated to be any more reassuring. If the purpose of legislation 
was to protect innocent wives and children, then ‘the way to do that is to bring motives to 
bear on the man and not on the woman’. Moreover, if the police were indeed to engage in 
‘espionage’ in order to identify diseased prostitutes, then the ‘same degree of espionage’ 
should ‘detect the men who go with’ them; who should, he added, ‘be obliged to give an 
account why they are here’. 99 
This latter point unsurprisingly caused especial consternation amongst the Commissioners. 
‘Am I to understand’, Sir John Packington Somerset inquired, that ‘you seriously propose 
that in this country we should adopt a system of espionage over every man seen going into a 
brothel, and that men seen to go into a brothel should be subject all alike to personal 
examination’.100 To which the answer was yes. Mill was not in favour of a system of 
espionage: but if there was to be one, it should apply equally to men as to women. And so, he 
added, should any consequential penalty. Aside from being ‘obliged’ to ‘account’ for 
themselves, men who have been found to ‘have communicated this disease to a modest 
women’ should be liable to pay ‘very severe damages’, whilst married women thus infected 
would have an immediate ‘remedy of divorce’. The ‘crime’ of infecting a wife was ‘one of 
the gravest a man could possibly commit’, it being ‘so serious as to warrant the dissolving of 
the marriage tie’.101 Sir John was no less horrified by this response, as was William Nathaniel 
Massey who felt obliged to request clarity; surely not the ‘complete dissolution of the 
matrimonial tie’? To which the answer was again yes, with the further rider that the decree 
should be accompanied ‘with heavy pecuniary damages’.102 
Much of what Mill said to the Commission chimed with the position taken by prominent 
women’s organisations such as the LNA. Aside from his incendiary insinuations in regard to 
the culpability of men, Mill reiterated a commonly articulated concern in regard to innocent, 
by implication respectable, women getting caught up in police sweeps of suspected 
prostitutes. He also enjoined a more principled concern regarding the ‘tyrannical operation of 
the force of law’ in regard to the compulsory physical examination of suspected prostitutes. 
The ‘security of personal liberty’, he observed, was ‘justified on principle’ and should not 
casually be legislated away on such a dubious cause.103 And it was not just the fact that the 
physical examination was an infringement of liberty, or that the reach of the legislation was 
too broad. Developing another argument commonly articulated by the LNA, Mill suggested 
that the Acts actually served to legitimise prostitution. ‘I do not’ he observed ‘think that 
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prostitution should be classed and recognized as such by the State’. The ‘State’, he added, ‘is 
in fact going out of its way to provide facilities for the practice of that profession’.104  
At the same time, there was a balance to be struck, between the principle of liberty and the 
practical needs of equality and justice. There was therefore a place for legal intervention. The 
working classes and working-class women in particular needed to be looked after, and 
improved. The Contagious Diseases Acts might be wrong, in both principle and practice, but 
Mill was quite prepared to contemplate alternative forms of statutory intervention.105 He was 
certainly supportive of measures designed to suppress pimping, especially of young girls. He 
was also inclined to toughen the penalties for sexual intercourse with a young girl, whilst also 
lowering the age barrier in regard to what the criminal law may treat as under-age.106 
Interestingly, Mill had cited pimping in On Liberty as an instance when the state might be 
entitled to intervene in order to deter someone from seeking ‘pecuniary gain’ by promoting 
an ‘evil’. Should ‘a person be free to pimp?’107 The state he continued, answering his own 
question, ‘cannot be acting wrongly in endeavouring to exclude the influence of solicitations 
which are not disinterested’.108 And whilst, in his evidence before the Commission, Mill 
admitted that the regulation of brothels was an ‘extremely difficult question’, he went on to 
suggest that it was not so much a question of whether they should be regulated, but of how 
and to what ‘degree’.109 Likewise, whilst disapproving the idea of regulatory ‘espionage’, he 
entirely accepted that the police should have a responsibility to control solicitation ‘in order 
to preserve the order of the streets’.110 He even went so far as to recommend some further 
legislation in order to deter child prostitution, ‘raising considerably the age below which it 
should be prohibited’ to have sexual intercourse of any kind.111 
It is evident that Mill condemned the practice of prostitution. But it is just as evident that he 
rejected the line taken by those who simply assumed that the solution lay in the persecution 
of women. There was again a place for state intervention, but it was an intervention that 
respected the liberty of women, and an equality of regulatory treatment. Both the liberalism, 
and the optimism, in Mill’s approach might be attributed, in part at least, to his faith in the 
potential impact of marriage reform. Mill believed that the advent of equal marriage, 
permitting divorce, and the cultivation of good Victorian character, would mean an end to the 
phenomenon of prostitution. There was, therefore, no apparent need for other or further 
regulation at that moment in time. It was this optimism which also underpinned his 
determined activism to improve the suffrage rights of women. If women had equal access to 
the vote, he assumed, many of the failings of society would diminish as women demanded 
change.   
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On Suffrage Reform  
It was towards the end of his life that the suffrage campaign dominated Mill’s activities and 
writing. He was closely involved, along with his daughter Helen, in the establishment of the 
London branch of the National Society for Women’s Suffrage, and he maintained a close 
interest in its operation up until his death in 1873. In fact, an interest in female suffrage could 
be detected in early correspondence, as well as some of the early draft papers that Mill 
composed with Harriet Taylor Mill.112 The broader debate regarding franchise reform during 
the 1860s provided a further stimulus. Mill was of course a supporter of further reform. But it 
was not unalloyed support. As he made clear in his 1866 essay Representative Government, 
Gladstone’s proposals for franchise reform were commendable precisely because they were 
‘not democratic’.113  Mill may not have gone quite so far as his friend Thomas Carlyle, who 
bemoaned the second Reform Act as ‘the end of our poor old England’, or indeed Walter 
Bagehot who said much the same in his acerbic Preface to the second edition of The English 
Constitution which appeared in 1872.114 But he shared a similar concern in regard to the 
prospective ‘despotism’ by the ‘People’.115 Would the ‘river’ of democracy ‘fertilize or lay 
waste’ to the ‘field’ he wondered?116 Mill’s idea of democracy was distinctly Periclean and 
paternal. The vote was less a ‘right’ than a ‘trust’, and whilst Mill never argued against the 
ideal of universal suffrage; his enthusiasm was judiciously tempered by the pragmatics of 
circumstance. Most of his countrymen, and countrywomen, could not as yet be trusted with 
the vote. In correspondence with Lord Grey, he suggested that in the case of the working-
classes the ‘right’ to vote should be conditional on first passing an educational test.117 In the 
meantime he sought to reassure Edwin Chadwick in 1859 that any women ‘enfranchised 
would be almost solely those of the higher and middle ranks’.118 
Unsurprisingly, the question of women’s suffrage assumed a significant presence in 
Subjection. Here again, Mill acknowledged that not everyone should have the ‘right of 
suffrage’. There would always be ‘needful securities and limitations’.119 But there was no 
inherent reason why any of these limitations should apply only to women. Mill took aim at 
the cultural prejudices which underpinned the doctrine of ‘separate spheres’, the ‘silly 
depreciation’ of the place of women in public life, made worse by ‘silly panegyrics’ such as 
Coventry Patmore’s iconic poem the ‘Angel in the House’.120 It was, he maintained, an 
‘obscure’ idea, almost too ‘ashamed to express itself openly’.121 Mill repeatedly averted to 
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the doctrine of ‘separate spheres’ in Parliamentary debate, noting in July 1866 the incongruity 
of excluding women ‘from the franchise by reason of their sex’ whilst at the same time 
celebrating the reign of Queen Victoria.122 The following year he returned to the theme, 
questioning ‘whether there is any adequate justification for continuing to exclude an entire 
half of the community’ from ‘the capability of ever being admitted within the pale of the 
Constitution’.123  Principal amongst the pretended justifications which Mill dismissed was 
that which presumed a ‘line of separation between women’s occupations and men’s’. Such a 
prejudice belonged to a ‘gone-by state of society’ now ‘receding further into the past’.124 No 
such line, he noted, seemed to apply in the matter of paying taxes. This was certainly 
something which the state deemed women to be ‘capable’ of doing.125 
But it was not, of course, simply a matter of principle. As he observed in Subjection, to ‘have 
a voice in choosing those by whom one is to be governed is a means of self-protection due to 
everyone’.126 The vote is a ‘guarantee of just and equal consideration’.127 In simple terms, it 
will make male legislators answerable to female constituents. When in 1867 Florence 
Nightingale wrote asking if there were ‘not evils which press more hardly on women than not 
having a vote’, she received an unambiguous reply: no.128 In his 1869 address to the London 
Society, Mill concluded: ‘Let us but gain the suffrage, and whatever is desirable for women 
must ultimately follow, without its being necessary at present to decide, or indeed possible to 
foresee, all that is desirable’. He suggested that the mere ‘claim’ to suffrage had already 
resulted in the presentation of new legislation regarding married women’s property.129  In his 
1870 address to the same body, he reiterated the argument. If women had been enfranchised, 
he supposed, Parliament would already have done something more about spousal abuse, and 
equally something rather less about contagious diseases.130 A century and a half of 
disappointment has led subsequent critics to recast this confidence as complacency.131 A right 
to vote has not prevented women being abused by their partners any more than it has ensured 
equality in the workplace, or eradicated prostitution.     
Society has still progressed. But it has not progressed as far as Mill would have hoped, for 
which reason, ever the pragmatist, he would have thought still more intensely about the 
relation of ends and means. The cause, as he repeatedly reminded his London Society 
audiences, was above all ‘practical’; a question of raising funds, presenting petitions, 
publishing pamphlets, persuading the people that mattered, pressing the case for practical 
legal and educational reform. Mill’s first thought was always strategic. When he was not 
cajoling suffrage societies, he was berating fellow Parliamentarians, making speeches, 
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presenting petitions and venturing amendments. He famously sought to have the word ‘man’ 
replaced with that of ‘person’ in Disraeli’s Reform bill. It was not that Mill hoped to sneak 
something through without anyone noticing; quite the reverse. In his Autobiography, he 
would later describe the gesture as ‘perhaps the only really important public service I 
performed in the capacity as a Member of Parliament’.132 
The presentation of petitions gestured to the same purpose. Mill was always ‘happy’ to 
present a suffrage petition if the ‘ladies in the locality’ of wherever could conjure up enough 
signatures.133 In June 1866 he presented the first suffrage petition to Parliament. It had 1499 
signatures. A year later he applauded the Manchester Suffrage Society for presenting a 
petition with 13,500.134 The following year he was triumphantly informing correspondents 
that the London Society had secured ‘nearly 14000 signatures, many of them names of great 
weight’, for a petition he intended to present. And ‘many more are expected’.135 Mill 
presented it in early June 1868, the day after he had presented a petition from the Belfast 
Society ‘in favour of the Bill for Amending the Law respecting the Property of Married 
Women’.136 The following month Mill reckoned that the total number of signatures collected 
in the various petitions that year exceeded 50,000. The ‘cause’ was ‘prospering beyond all 
hope’.137 Pages and pages of correspondence from 1869 and 1870 were given over to urging 
the collection of more and more signatures for more and more petitions. When it was noted 
that there were no ‘correspondents’ in Stoke-on-Trent, potentially therefore a vast untapped 
reserve of prospective signers, Mill wanted to know why. More importantly he wanted 
something to be done about it.138 No stone was to be left unturned. When it came to his 
attention, a little later, that the Cobden Working Men’s Club, Bermondsey, did it not permit 
women to join on ‘equal terms’, he again wanted to know why.139 The name might be 
exclusive, but the cause was common.  
Another strategy which Mill energetically supported was the promotion of women elsewhere 
in public life. Time and again in his correspondence Mill can be found celebrating the 
election of women to School Boards, or their appointment as librarians or secretaries of 
academic or professional associations.140  He had once again alluded to the issue, if at a 
tangent, in Subjection, not least in a long passage in chapter three in which he reminded his 
readers of all the famous women who had ruled countries and won battles, from Elizabeth I to 
the biblical Deborah to Joan of Arc.141 History suggests that women might actually be better 
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suited to government than men; more measured, less inclined to run ‘wild after an 
abstraction’, possessed of a useful female intuition, better equipped, to use a more modern 
term, to multi-task. There is an almost Thatcherite tone in his suggestion that the 
‘superintendence of a household’ is an effective training for government; as there is in the 
ensuing suggestion that so many middle-class women had already proved themselves by 
running local charities.142 In his 1869 address to the London Society, he reiterated the 
apparently unarguable fact that everyone knows that the ‘fittest person to manage a 
workhouse is the person who best knows how to manage a house’, just as ‘every experienced 
traveller knows that there are few comfortable inns where there is no hostess’.143 
Not that Mill had an unalloyed admiration of the female temperament, or indeed women in 
general. He was notably acerbic in regard to a species of ‘literary’ women which scattered its 
audience with a familiar array of tired romantic prejudices and ‘artificial products’.144 There 
were exceptions. Mill was an avowed admirer of Madame de Stael, as he was George 
Sand.145 But there were not many.146 And he was just as exercised by the accepting woman as 
he was the ‘literary’ or the ‘pushing’. Periodically, as in 1848, he articulated a broader 
disappointment at the apparent lack of revolutionary ‘spirit’ amongst his compatriots, male 
and female. But he was especially concerned by the number of women who seemed to just 
accept their fate.147 He expected little of the working-class.148 But he expected a lot more of 
the ‘intelligent’ class of women.149 ‘The most important thing we now have to do’, he 
observed to Alexander Bain in summer 1869, ‘is to stir up the zeal of women themselves’.150 
He ventured alternative explanations. The ‘ascendency’ of clerical opinions ‘over the minds 
of many women’ was one.151 Another was the ‘habits of submission’ into which women are 
educated.152 Either way, progress in regard not just to the emancipation of women but in the 
broader ‘condition’ of England, depended on getting women to think rather more intelligently 
about their lot. 
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The case for female education was also pivotal in Mill’s perception. In broader terms, 
education was the dynamic for progress, political, social and moral.153 He was a vigorous 
campaigner for the admission of women into University and various institutes of professional 
training; something that aligned the cause of better education with the strategic imperative of 
placing women in the public sphere.154 In his 1867 Commons speech on the Admission of 
Women to the Electoral Franchise he made specific reference to the case of Elizabeth Garrett 
who had dodged the various obstacles placed in her way and snuck in through the ‘doors’ of 
the Society of Apothecaries.155  Ensuring the place of women in proposals for universal 
primary education was a larger aspiration. Here again the egalitarian Mill recommended the 
constructive responsibility of the state.156 Ensuring universal, and compulsory, education was 
precisely the kind of thing that a modern state should do. The cause of educational reform 
was at the centre of his 1869 and 1870 addresses to the London Society. The right to vote was 
never natural. It was civil and qualified and earned, for women as for men. In the 1870 
address, he ‘freely’ confessed that until the ‘political education of women’ was ‘greatly 
improved’, the case for female suffrage could not be ‘affirmed with any confidence’.157 
Mr Mill’s Influence 
We are likely to be frustrated if we try to ascertain a coherent Millian position on women and 
the law. It is not just that there are so many different Mills, libertarian, egalitarian, ethical, 
feminist, radical, conflicted, downright perplexing. There is inconsistency too. Mill’s 
thinking evolved. Sometimes Mill seems a more liberal feminist, even perhaps a conservative 
one. At other times, he assumes a position that might indeed be termed radical. The Mill who 
put so much stock in securing the vote for women, seems to be rather more liberal than the 
Mill who blamed men for the plight of prostituted women before the Royal Commissioners in 
1870. And the context shifted too. As a responsive campaigner, Mill was stimulated by 
contemporary debate; which is why he had so much to say about marriage, domestic violence 
and the vote, and so little it seems about other issues which have since assumed such a 
prominent place in gender debates. It might have been expected, for example, that he would 
have been drawn into debates surrounding the passage of Lord Campbell’s 1857 Obscene 
Publications Act; for which reason it might have been possible to place Mill within more 
modern debates regarding pornography regulation. But if Mill’s attention was captured by the 
1857 Act, no record remains. The reason is probably quite simple. The Act was not 
controversial, and was not perceived as touching upon the larger ‘question’ of women. We 
are accordingly left to surmise.  
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The 1857 Act was not the only piece of contemporary legislation that failed to capture Mill’s 
attention. Throughout the second part of the nineteenth century, Parliament was repeatedly 
presented with bills intended to permit widowers to marry their deceased wives’ sisters. Mill 
however appears to have barely noticed. When asked for his opinion on the subject, by a 
prospective Westminster constituent in 1865, he replied that he had not given it much 
thought, but on balance could see no reason to oppose the legislation.158 Conversely, whilst 
they did not consume his attention in the same way as the larger questions of matrimonial law 
reform, female suffrage, and even repeal of the Contagious Diseases Acts, Mill’s attention 
could be caught by more transient matters of public interest, especially those ‘scares’ which 
would periodically possess the more impressionable sections of mid-Victorian society. As 
early as 1846 he was writing to the Morning Chronicle on the subject of child-murder. If 
mothers were indeed murdering their children, and in the kind of numbers which some more 
excitable coroners supposed, it was a consequence not of intrinsic evil, but brutal social 
circumstance and the legally instantiated hypocrisy which refused to cast any aspersion on 
their ‘seducers’.159 In a similar vein, he felt moved to alert readers of the Daily News in 1858 
to the parlous state of English Lunacy law, and the potential it offered to mendacious 
husbands who wanted rid of unwanted wives; a ‘fate’ he concluded that was ‘more cruel and 
hopeless than the most rigorous imprisonment’.160  
In the final analysis, however, Mill’s critical reputation as a feminist rests squarely on his 
more concentrated writings and speeches on the questions of matrimonial law, domestic 
abuse, prostitution and the vote. He was certainly appreciated on these terms by 
contemporaries. Shortly after his death, Millicent Garrett Fawcett would declare: 
There can be no doubt that Mr Mill’s influence marks an epoch in the women’s 
movement. He was a master and formed a school of thought. Just as in art, a master 
forms a school and influences his successors for generations, so the present leaders 
and champions of the women’s movement have been influenced and to a great extent 
formed by Mr Mill.161 
James Fitzjames Stephen may have been appalled by what he encountered in the pages of 
Mill’s Subjection, but suffragettes such as Kate Amberley cherished it, not least because it 
helped to get ‘all the arguments into my head and have them ready for any scoffers’; such as 
Fitzjames Stephen.162 Mill had his detractors no doubt. Josephine Butler never forgave his 
reluctance to properly enjoin her crusade against the Contagious Diseases Acts. And the 
detractors remain, as we have already noted. The recommendation of ‘ideal’ marriages 
continues to grate with some. Mill’s views on sexuality seem odd, as do his assorted 
recommendations that financial checks be run on prospective parents, that there should be 
limits to the number of children in any one family, and that the most effective solution to the 
problem of spousal abuse might be corporal punishment. And there is the residual naivety. He 
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expected too much of educational provision, just as he assumed too much of the suffrage. But 
it was the same optimism which energised.163 On presenting yet another suffrage petition to 
Parliament, he exulted to Sir Charles Dilke: ‘Is there not something marvellous in so great a 
progress?’164 Society was perfectible. It was just a matter of making an effort. ‘We live’, 
another correspondent was reminded, ‘in times when broad principles of justice, 
perseveringly proclaimed, end by carrying the world with them’.165  
History has confounded the optimism. As long ago as 1977, Julia Annas observed that:  ‘It 
will be a good day when The Subjection of Women is outdated, but it is not yet’.166 Four 
decades on there is no reason to dissent from the sentiment. Much indeed remains to be done. 
But, this is not to disparage the place of Mill or his Subjection in the continuing struggle to 
improve the ‘condition’ of women in modern society; quite the converse. The core argument, 
that the law should recognise a fundamental equality between men and women, is 
unarguable. It was in 1869. It is today. And there is something else too. Perhaps the greatest 
insight written into Subjection, and one of those most commonly overlooked, is the fact that it 
is not just about women.167 Mill the pragmatist might have been more immediately concerned 
with ‘the unspeakable gain in private happiness to the liberated half of the species’ that 
further reform of marriage law and the granting of the vote would realise.168 But Mill the 
utilitarian speculator was possessed of a rather larger ambition; to improve society as a 
whole. The aspiration was vividly drawn in his 1851 essay on The Enfranchisement of 
Women. The jurisprudentially enforced subjugation of women ‘is corrupting equally to both; 
in the one if produces the vices of power, in the other those of artifice’.169 Towards the end of 
Subjection he declared that: 
The moral regeneration of mankind will only really commence, when the most 
fundamental of the social relations is placed under the rule of equal justice, and when 
human beings learn to cultivate their strongest sympathy with an equal in rights and in 
cultivation.170 
And, as he concluded in the very final sentences of the same, despite all the undoubted 
benefits that would flow from the collateral improvement of cultural and social expectations, 
the reform of education and manners, what really mattered was reform of the law relating to 
women. Their subjection was reinforced ‘by actual law’, and it could only be relieved when 
that law was reformed.171 For Mill, the law was both an instrument of women’s subjection 
and a prospective means of liberation.   
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